A Hidden Crisis in the Sahel

CIVIC interviewed three civil society organizations working in the Sahel to understand their views on how the protection situation in the Sahel has evolved over the last year and how they would recommend regional governments and donors shift their activities and priorities to address evolving protection threats. The following reflects a paraphrased summary of the questions and responses.

Q: How would you describe 2023 concerning the situation of civilians in the Sahel?

The situation has worsened, as evidenced by several indicators. The number of refugees is increasing, and communities have experienced massacres and blockades as well as attacks on schools, transport buses, and civilian transport boats. There is also intimidation against international organizations and civil society actors.

Overall, in the wake of successive military coups promising to improve security across the region, political violence levels in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have together increased by 5 percent relative to the same period last year, and by 46 percent compared to 2021. Violence targeting civilians has increased by 38 percent in Mali, with insecurity spreading into new areas. Intercommunal conflict in the central Sahel has intensified, leading to clashes between farmers and herders in the region. In Niger, ECOWAS sanctions have disrupted food imports, causing commodity prices to spike. More generally, food insecurity is an under-recognized source of civilian suffering, as are floods and high temperatures, which are contributing to civilian vulnerability.

Civilian victims are often invisible, and their voices are not heard.
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Q: What are the main reasons explaining the evolution of the situation?

There is a weakening of the human rights discourse that aims, among other things, to place human well-being at the center of public debate. It clashes with the opposite discourse, where it is said that all means used to win the war are good. Also, there is a desensitization to violence and a rejection of the idea that human life is important and legitimate. We are no longer moved by massacres.

A militarization of state response to jihadist violence is also to blame. National armies have increased the pace of their operations and are using heavier military equipment. There is also the involvement of the Russians—the Wagner Group—who are responsible for the rape and abuse of women and children. Their method of directly attacking non-state armed groups also causes these groups to panic and target civilians when responding to attacks.

Other countries, motivated by security concerns and a fear of the potential contagion of coups, have also contributed to the suffering of civilians by adopting a firm stance against military transitions.
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Q: How have local non-governmental protection actors responded/adapted to these major changes? What are the main challenges for local organizations implicated in the protection of civilians in the Sahel?

Insecurity has impacted our activities. Donors no longer want to fund certain projects, and because the state feels targeted, it blocks civil society organizations working on security issues. Humanitarian workers have increasingly limited access to deliver aid—especially to reach those who need it most, such as displaced people and children.

The context is weakening for human rights actors, which reduces their ability to hold discourse on the protection of civilians, and they have very few allies. Those who represent the human rights discourse become targets—they are discredited, considered traitors. To be effective, we have to move away from the vocabulary of international human rights and enter it through the narratives of local culture.
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Q: What would you recommend to the transitional authorities in the Sahel countries to address these concerns?

Sahelian authorities have to realize that their legitimacy will depend on their ability to protect civilians—they will be judged on the results. They also have to understand that the objectives of non-governmental organizations working on the protection of civilians are the same as the government, and that they are allies with the same objectives even if the strategy is not the same (using the military versus other measures, for example). They should support non-governmental organizations in the implementation of their activities by ensuring safe access.

Authorities also have to invest at the community level, including in civil-military dialogues, community policing, and youth job creation. Community leaders and religious leaders should be more involved in public communication so they can be bearers of this discourse of protection regarding the most vulnerable.
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Q: What would you recommend to donors shifting their priorities from the Sahel to other regions?

Abandoning the Sahel countries is paving the way for future crises, and the challenges will be even greater afterward. We must not make the mistake of separating the Sahel from the rest of West Africa. The dynamics are cross-border, and a holistic response is needed to address the challenges. We are currently in a logic of compartmentalizing the regions, but it is a whole. As long as the epicenters of violence are not stabilized, the success of other efforts will be limited. It is like pouring water into a leaky gourd.

Donors should stay, but they should change their approach and strategy by focusing more on localized projects, working directly with communities and CSOs and respecting the choices of partners, authorities, and communities.

An Escalating and Often Overlooked Protection Crisis in Myanmar

This article was authored by the Myanmar Protection Cluster and the Global Protection Cluster based on 2023 monitoring data.

Throughout 2023, the protection situation for millions of people across Myanmar significantly worsened, severely compromising their safety and curbing their rights. Outside Ukraine and the occupied Palestinian territory, Myanmar recorded the highest number of conflict fatalities in the world in 2023 (including civilians and combatants).³

Myanmar's civil war, which began in 1948, has been marked by persistent conflict between the central government (predominantly composed of the Bamar majority) and ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) across seven ethnic states. Military takeovers have also punctuated Myanmar's political landscape, notably the 1962 coup led by General Ne Win, which ushered in 26 years of military rule. In 1990, Aung San Suu Kyi and her National League for Democracy (NLD) won a landslide victory in elections. However, the military subsequently annulled the election results, maintaining power for another 25 years until the NLD triumphed again in 2015.⁴ Since the latest military takeover, which started in February 2021, human rights actors have documented a variety of violations committed by the Myanmar military forces, including mass killings, arbitrary arrests, torture, and sexual violence.⁵ Myanmar's people have engaged in widespread civil disobedience and resistance against the country’s return to military rule. Disparate rebel groups have united in their opposition to the military, and fighting between non-state resistance armed groups and the military junta has worsened the disproportionate harm experienced by civilians.⁶

With already severe humanitarian needs linked with conflict, violence, and climate-related crises, a further escalation of the conflict in Myanmar starting in 2023 dramatically exacerbated a range of protection risks experienced by communities. As a result of the surge in fighting, an additional 700,000 people were forcibly displaced between October and December 2023 as they fled their homes and villages in search of safety and protection. This number is added to the 2 million people who were already displaced. The most significant increases of internally displaced persons (IDPs) were in the northwest and southeast of the country, areas where humanitarian actors are extremely limited in their ability to deliver humanitarian assistance and where civilians therefore have minimal access to aid.

The growing conflict in Myanmar has been marked by appalling attacks on civilians and civilian objects. Civilians face a high risk of physical bodily harm from the large-scale use of landmines and explosive remnants of war (ERW), both in areas of the country newly exposed to war and in those facing protracted conflict. There was a 270 percent increase in landmine and explosive ordnance-related casualties in 2023, with more than 1,000 people injured from these weapons. Moreover, daily airstrikes and shelling have caused widespread damage to civilian infrastructure, such as schools, hospitals, and religious buildings, while personal property has also been damaged or destroyed in airstrikes. Villages and farms have been burned to the ground. At the same time, the risks associated with forced recruitment (including of children), arbitrary arrest and detention, and GBV (including conflict-related sexual violence), have all been on the rise.

Amid the worsening humanitarian and protection crises, there has also been a significant increase in restrictions on freedom of movement across the country, with combatants erecting checkpoints and roadblocks and carrying out household searches. These restrictions hinder the ability of people to farm their fields, access markets, and reach essential services. It is common for civilians moving through checkpoints to experience intimidation, harassment, extortion, and denial of passage, even for those seeking healthcare services and emergency medical assistance.

The Myanmar protection monitoring incident system shows that the top five rights violations in 2023 were extortion, restrictions on freedom of movement, intimidation, arbitrary and unlawful detention, and indiscriminate attacks on civilians and civilian objects. The main perpetrator was identified as the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF). The top five townships affected were Sittwe, Kyaukkyi, Mrauk-U, Bhamo, and Kale, with Rakhine State recording the highest number of incidents for extortion and forced labor. Members of the Rohingya and Kaman minority groups (often also stateless) were disproportionately affected.

Protection actors in Myanmar—particularly local organizations, women’s rights organizations, and community networks—have continued to advance creative approaches to providing protection interventions and assistance despite the worsening situation. These include engagement and negotiations for protection with parties to the conflict, the provision of protection support more broadly, and ongoing legal assistance, medical care, and psychosocial support for GBV survivors, in particular. Communities themselves are not only on the frontlines of the conflict in Myanmar, where they are exposed to severe risks, they are leading the protection response. With myriad access restrictions for international actors, community groups and local humanitarian actors are often the ones with the presence, relationships, and networks needed to support affected populations in accessing urgent humanitarian assistance and protection. Yet, given major funding limitations, they continue to struggle with scaling their reach and impact. Protection partners need to shift their focus from long-term services such as psychosocial support and case management to emergency responses, including cash assistance and referrals. Mobile approaches to aid delivery are also critical due to rapidly changing security, access, and funding considerations. The Protection Cluster and Areas of Responsibility continue to strengthen and improve protection mainstreaming across the response, with a particular focus on supporting local and national partners.

In early 2024, a new national conscription law and forced recruitment has driven further displacement inside Myanmar and across borders to neighboring countries, creating a new regional dimension to the crisis that demands novel approaches to engagement with Myanmar’s neighboring countries. There are, for example, reports of Rohingya people being coerced into fighting through incentives and threats, fueling inter-ethnic tension.

With no end to the conflict in sight, the Myanmar military continues to enjoy absolute impunity while civilians grapple with severe protection risks. Scaled-up engagement by regional stakeholders and the international community is urgently needed—including via enhanced humanitarian diplomacy, support for accountability, and a humanitarian response commensurate with the shocking levels of protection risks and humanitarian needs across the country.

Extreme Violence Below the Threshold of Armed Conflict

Civilians in Mexico, Brazil, and Haiti face daily and relentless threats to their lives and well-being. For the sixth consecutive year, Mexico reported more than 30,000 murders, signaling the most violent period in the country’s recent history.⁷ Much of this violence in Mexico stems from competition between more than 70 active gangs and drug cartels controlling large swaths of territory and vying for political and economic dominance.⁸

Gangs in Haiti—facilitated by weak governance, corruption, and an overburdened police force—expanded their influence, as well, eventually taking control over 80 percent of the country’s capital. In the first nine months of 2023, more than 5,600 gang-related incidents were recorded in Haiti, including 3,156 murders and 1,248 kidnappings.⁹ The UN Security Council sanctioned a multinational security force, spearheaded by Kenya, to aid Haitian authorities in combating gang violence. However, the deployment of this mission faced numerous delays.

In Brazil, the authorities have used militarized approaches to combat organized crime. As of June 2023, over 649,000 people were imprisoned in the country, exceeding the capacity of the country’s prisons by 34 percent.¹⁰ Civilian harm as a result of police brutality has historically been a serious concern in Brazil. In 2023, the Brazilian police killed 6,381 people, and Black people comprised a disproportionate number of those killed. A majority of these killings resulted from the unlawful use of force.¹¹ For the fourteenth consecutive year, Brazil recorded the highest number of transgender persons killed anywhere in the world.¹²

ACLED’s Conflict Index tracks every country in the world according to four indicators: deadliness, danger to civilians, geographic diffusion, and armed group fragmentation. In 2023, Mexico topped the list as the fourth most concerning country with extreme levels of violence. Brazil and Haiti are also categorized by the Conflict Index as having extreme levels of violence—they are ranked sixth and eighth, respectively. Mexico, Brazil, and Haiti are different from the other countries ACLED categorizes as extremely violent, however, in that they are the only three not classified as armed conflicts.

In order to be classified as an armed conflict under international humanitarian law (IHL), violence in a country must reach a certain level of intensity, typically characterized by the use of weapons and the number of casualties involved. The parties involved in the conflict must exhibit a certain degree of organization to engage in sustained military operations, regardless of whether they are governmental forces or non-state armed groups. The conflict must be over a territory where one or more of the parties extends a certain level of territorial control or authority. A conflict that meets these criteria is classified as an international or non-international armed conflict—a classification that triggers a specific set of legal obligations for parties to the conflict and special protection for civilians subjected to the conflict. These obligations include the duty of parties to distinguish between combatants and civilians, a prohibition against targeting civilians and civilian objects, and a requirement to provide humanitarian assistance to those in need. Mexico, Brazil, and Haiti do not meet these criteria despite the devastating toll that violence has had on civilians.

In some countries facing high levels of organized violence or political instability, including those addressed here, non-state armed groups do not meet the threshold of organization or territorial control required to classify the conflict as armed violence. Many urban regions, where the focus of non-state armed groups is localized territorial control for economic gains, suffer from high levels of violence caused by gang wars and organized crime. Crackdowns by authoritarian regimes on civil protestors can also spark brutal confrontations that result in severe damage and loss of civilian lives without meeting the threshold of violence for an armed conflict under IHL.

Even in situations where armed conflict is not formally recognized under IHL, states still have obligations under international human rights law to protect the rights and safety of their citizens, including taking measures to address violence and maintain public security. Yet countries with high levels of violence that fall outside armed conflict classifications are at risk of receiving insufficient attention from donors and multilateral peacebuilding institutions. The extreme levels of harm civilians experience in Mexico, Brazil, and Haiti require action on the part of governments and national security forces to evaluate their own practices, reduce the negative impact of their security force activities and operations on civilians, and adapt protection tools to their evolving security environments. National and international protection actors should ensure these states do not go unrecognized and unaddressed, including by: instituting monitoring, early warning, and response mechanisms for violence; strengthening rule of law and accountability efforts for human rights violations; promoting conflict resolution and mediation initiatives; and empowering local communities in their efforts to address violence.