Overview

2023 was a grim year for civilians across the globe. Most of the measures available for tracking and understanding the impact of armed conflict and acute situations of violence on civilians indicated a deterioration in conditions. The United Nations (UN) recorded 33,443 civilian deaths in armed conflict in 2023—a 72 percent increase from the previous year—and this number represents only a small portion of the true cost of violence on civilians. Many more civilians died as a result of conflict-induced hunger and a lack of access to medical care stemming from war than were killed directly in fighting alone. Sexual violence was also perpetrated against civilians across the globe, and armed actors committed unprecedented levels of violations against children, including the recruitment or use of children in armed forces and armed groups and the denial of humanitarian access for children. Moreover, conflict drove displacement to record levels, with 117 million people displaced internally or across international borders by the end of the year.

The conflict between Israel and Palestinian armed groups, in particular Israel’s military campaign in Gaza in response to the October 7, 2023, attacks by Hamas militants against Israeli border communities, drove much of the increase in civilian deaths. The use of explosive weapons by the Israeli military in densely populated areas of the Gaza Strip has been particularly destructive, killing large numbers of civilians and destroying infrastructure critical to the survival and well-being of the civilian population. Some of these strikes appear to have violated international humanitarian law (IHL). Overall, monitoring organizations recorded a larger number of civilians killed by explosive weapons in 2023 than in 2022, as well as an 80 percent increase in attacks on educational facilities and workers and a 12 percent increase in attacks on healthcare facilities and workers. In addition to the occupied Palestinian territory (oPt), civilians in Lebanon, Myanmar, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, and Yemen were the most heavily impacted by explosive weapons in 2023.

The effects of initial attacks and displacements also reverberate over time, creating additional harms and barriers to civilian well-being. Survivors of sexual violence are often stigmatized within their communities. Children can carry mental scars that will undermine their ability to develop and learn. Families that lose one or more member to violence sometimes struggle to protect and feed their remaining members. Contaminated soil and damaged ecosystems can prevent communities from farming and leave them food insecure for generations.

CIVIC’s Civilian Protection Index, developed for this annual report, helps shed light on the level of protection civilians experience in 163 countries across the globe. The index is comprised of 15 indicators that measure aspects of protection—including direct and indirect measures of violence like civilian deaths, sexual violence, and the number of firearms circulating among the population—as well as attributes of protective environments, such as trust in government institutions and the quality of civic space. The indicators used to consider the protection situation for civilians in these countries do not take into account predictive measures that could indicate the potential for the situation to deteriorate in the coming years. Moreover, they rely, in part, on civilian opinion survey data. Civilians with relatively low expectations for government institutions can sometimes rate their experiences more highly than those with high expectations of security and justice from their governments. Nevertheless, the index provides insights into the protection environments civilians face across the globe, their perspectives on security, and the elements of protection that are most concerning in each country.

When compiled, this data reveals that civilians in Afghanistan, Chad, China, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Equatorial Guinea, Haiti, Lebanon, Myanmar, North Korea, occupied Palestinian territory, Russia, South Sudan, Sudan, Syria, Yemen, and Venezuela faced the most dire protection situations in 2023. Different issues drove the protection concerns in these various countries. For example, in Sudan, sexual violence, displacement, and low levels of peacebuilding aid were the factors most responsible for the country’s low protection rating.1 In contrast, protection concerns in North Korea were driven by the lack of civic space and freedom of the press alongside high levels of disinformation. Because of the substantially different factors driving protection concerns in these countries (particularly those that are conflict-affected and those not facing armed conflict), different approaches and policy interventions would be needed to address protection concerns in these countries. Although Burkina Faso, Mali, and Ukraine had some of the highest levels of civilian casualties per capita, citizens’ more positive views on the performance of state institutions in these countries (and, in the case of Ukraine, the high levels of peacebuilding aid) prevented them from falling into the lowest protection category overall. Based on CIVIC’s Civilian Protection Index, Bhutan, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Indonesia, Ireland, Japan, Lithuania, Malaysia, the Netherlands, Norway, Senegal, Singapore, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, and Zambia enjoyed the strongest protection environment in 2023.

Beyond the situation in individual countries, larger trends are changing the way that war is fought and experienced by civilians globally. Technological developments in artificial intelligence (AI) in 2023 created new risks for civilians living in conflict-affected countries. While growing access to the Internet and smartphones often enhances protection in some ways, it also increases the reach of harmful misinformation, disinformation, malinformation, and hate speech (MDMH), which warring parties sometimes target at civilians. In 2023, MDMH of this nature contributed to civilian harm. Additionally, in recent decades, conflict parties have increasingly turned to private military and security companies (PMSCs) to fill a variety of roles, including fighting in place of or alongside national security forces as well as training and equipping them. While not outside of the law, it is more challenging to ensure PMSCs uphold international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights law (IHRL). It is also more challenging to hold them accountable when they fail to do so. Furthermore, global temperatures continued to rise in 2023. As climatic hazards intersected with conflict, they combined with and magnified civilian vulnerabilities and subsequent protection risks.

Some of the effects of conflicts in 2023 were made visible through regular national and international media coverage. However, some contexts with extreme levels of harm went under-recognized. For example, countries in the Sahel—Burkina Faso and Mali, in particular—received little media attention considering the high numbers of civilians killed there in 2023.Such disparate levels of media attention can reflect or translate into uneven levels of donor support and political engagement to resolve conflicts.

Humanitarians responding to protection threats also faced higher levels of death and injury last year, with twice as many humanitarians killed in 2023 as in 2022. While humanitarian assistance actors continued to emphasize the importance of ensuring that aid and programming delivery be locally led, donor money continued to flow primarily to or through international organizations for response. Moreover, national and local non-governmental and civil society organizations often faced the highest risks in delivering assistance and protection programming to those in need, and they did so without adequate support from international partners. Notably, in 2023, countries facing war and instability increasingly looked to ad hoc and regional military coalitions to help support them rather than preferencing UN peacekeeping missions with a significant history of deploying under Protection of Civilians mandates.

None of the adverse trends highlighted in this report were inevitable, and many of them could be reversed. Moreover, some of the developments that are currently creating risks for civilians—for example, the use of AI and the increasing reliance on regional military coalitions rather than UN peacekeepers—could contribute significantly to the protection of civilians if properly regulated or supported. The tools to do so largely already exist. The year 2024 marks the 75th anniversary of the Geneva Conventions, for example, which outline rules for conducting warfare in a more humane way. It is also the 25th anniversary of the UN Security Council recognizing protection of civilians as a matter of international peace and security.

Some states, militaries, and military coalitions have led the way in incorporating protective principles and measures into their own laws, policies and practices, including by codifying IHL and IHRL into national laws and by drafting, approving, and implementing Protection of Civilians policies and guidelines. UN bodies, meanwhile, have developed extensive systems for monitoring violations, sanctioning violators, providing physical protection to civilians, promoting protection through dialogue and engagement, and building a protective environment. International accountability mechanisms exist, as do models for national accountability, justice, reconciliation, and redress initiatives. Policymakers and armed actors should also listen directly to the voices and perspectives of civilians, who can often articulate their needs and solutions to civilian harm better than anyone else. Moreover, states need to demonstrate the political will to better protect civilians and invest in mechanisms that have been developed to do so. Chief among these efforts should be preventing civilian harm, not just responding when it occurs. Without more meaningful action, civilians will continue to face unacceptable levels of suffering.

The intention of this report is not only to identify data and trends that illustrate civilian harm but to identify high-priority concerns that require definitive action by state and intergovernmental organizations. It provides states with clear recommendations for doing so. This overview is followed by high-level recommendations for states, the UN Security Council (UNSC), UN peacekeeping missions, and regional organizations. The “Recognize” section of this report profiles areas of the world that are severely affected by conflict yet under-recognized for various reasons, including the scarcity of data, the lack of focused media attention on the crises, and the low levels of traditional geopolitical interest. “Spotlight” articles throughout this section highlight the situation in Myanmar, the Sahel, and countries with extreme levels of violence that do not rise to situations of international or non-international armed conflict. The next section of the report, “Prevent,” illustrates trends in the use of AI, MDMH, and PMSCs during conflict and the ways that climate change and conflict interact to exacerbate civilian harm. Featured articles in this section include a focus on the spread of MDMH in UN peacekeeping settings, addressing the systemic and legal policy challenges of PMSCs in contemporary armed conflicts, and the climate-security nexus in northeast Nigeria. The “Protect” section of the report then covers trends and analysis relating to the impact of extreme violence or armed conflict on civilians, as well as efforts by protection actors to respond to threats and protection needs. Spotlight content in this section includes: a call-to-action by a global network of victims and survivors to end wartime sexual violence, a video highlighting the impact of explosive weapons on hospitals and medical care, and an appeal from the voices of civilians affected by explosive weapons. It also includes articles on a range of key issues, trends, and mechanisms related to the protection of civilians in specific conflict locations. The final component of the report, the “Amend” section, underscores the reverberating effects violence has on civilians and the need for accountability, restoration, and redress. This section features a photo essay on unexploded ordnance in the Central African Republic (CAR), as well as articles on the mental health of children experiencing conflict, amends in United States harm response policy with a focus on Somalia, the preferences of Afro-Colombia women seeking redress, and avenues for justice in Afghanistan.

Roadmap for Action

Recommendations for States:

  • Implement at a national level all international legal obligations related to the protection of civilians, including those contained in IHL. States should establish relevant policies, guidelines, and doctrine for operationalizing legal protection obligations and non-legal/binding best practices. Such efforts could include: voluntary national IHL reports, national Protection of Civilians policies, civilian harm mitigation (CHM) doctrine, and operational frameworks on protection and CHM for state security forces.
  • Help ensure the respect for IHL and the protection of civilians by other states, including by using diplomatic pressure, conditioning military support and joint operations on compliance with IHL, and providing legal support to other states.2
  • Implement the Framework for the Prevention of Conflict-Related Sexual Violence (CRSV), including by developing or strengthening national conflict-related sexual violence prevention plans.
  • Pursue accountability for CRSV and grave violations committed against children, including by supporting timely investigations and prosecutions.
  • Prioritize child protection and women protection considerations in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration initiatives.
  • Endorse and effectively implement the Political Declaration on Strengthening the Protection of Civilians from the Humanitarian Consequences Arising from the Use of Explosive Weapons in Populated Areas (EWIPA), including by discontinuing the use of heavy explosive weapons in populated areas, taking additional precautions to ensure that explosive weapons do not strike educational infrastructure, health infrastructure, and other infrastructure critical to the survival and well-being of the civilian population, disseminating the policy nationally, and instituting policy review processes to identify the extent to which the Political Declaration is being successfully implemented.
  • Protect civic space and create an environment where civil society organizations can operate freely.
  • In line with UNSC Resolution 2730, strengthen efforts to protect UN and humanitarian personnel and their facilities in accordance with international law.
  • Increase efforts to allocate funding directly to national and local NGOs and civil society organizations in countries where humanitarian aid is being delivered, and support these organizations in strengthening their coordination mechanisms.
  • In humanitarian crises and conflicts with high risks to civilians: strengthen support for inclusive, people-centered approaches to protecting civilians, incorporating greater recognition of the specific needs in each context. In addition, integrate the direct participation of affected civilians and communities in decision making, planning, and programs.
  • Refrain from transferring arms to other states when there is an overriding risk that the arms will be used to commit or facilitate violations of IHL, and consider how to prevent arms transfers from creating other risks to civilians.
  • Guarantee that AI military capabilities are used in compliance with international law, including by ensuring that the use of AI-enabled systems does not cause disproportionate harm to civilians or civilian objects.
  • Subject the design and development of military AI capabilities to extensive auditing and transparency processes.
  • Negotiate a legally binding instrument to regulate all autonomous weapons systems. In addition, prohibit lethal autonomous weapons systems that function without human control and oversight and that cannot be used in compliance with IHL.
  • Invest in media literacy and strengthen national legislation on MDMH by, for example increasing regulation of social media platforms that profit from the promotion and virality of MDMH (without compromising human rights).
  • Create or strengthen national legislation regulating mercenaries as well as PMSCs based on established international instruments and guidance.
  • Prioritize preventive action, including institutional capacity-building at the national level for the regulation of PMSCs in fragile and conflict-affected contexts.
  • Enhance the capacity of security forces to respond effectively to climate-related threats and invest in stock-taking exercises to assess when security forces (as compared to other actors) are the best actor to respond to climate disasters.
  • Help communities build resilience against climate impacts through education, infrastructure development, and sustainable livelihoods programs.
  • Ensure accountability and amends for civilian harm, including by increasing investments in national and international victim funds and guaranteeing that funds set aside to redress harm to civilians are distributed to survivors in a timely manner.
  • Involve survivors—including marginalized societal groups—more substantively in the shaping of justice and reconciliation mechanisms. Tailor amends and reparations to the self-identified needs and preferences of these groups, ensuring that they are culturally sensitive.
  • Prioritize renewed and sustained funding and engagement for resolving conflicts in countries where the level of human suffering is greatest, not just where geopolitical or media interests are highest.
  • Ensure situations of extreme violence that fall below the threshold of armed conflict receive adequate policy attention in national and intergovernmental forums.

Recommendations for the UNSC and UN General Assembly:

  • More fully utilize UN sanctions regimes to promote accountability for violations against civilians—including CRSV and grave violations committed against children—while upholding humanitarian exemptions, as recognized in UNSC Resolution 2664.
  • Support the negotiation of a legally binding instrument to regulate the use of autonomous weapons systems.
  • Promote the growth of international norms against the use of MDMH targeted at civilians that is likely to contribute significantly to civilian harm, and promote the growth of international norms in support of digital spaces with transparent content moderation policies that respect human rights.
  • Support the protection of civilians through UN peace operations by prioritizing protection tasks in mandates, providing guidance on the comprehensive implementation of protection tasks, providing consistent and unified political support for peace operations, and providing missions with appropriate funding and resources to implement their protection mandates.
  • Consider measures that can be taken to improve the safety and security of UN and humanitarian personnel, including by acting on forthcoming (November 2024) recommendations from the UN Secretary-General on implementing Resolution 2730.
  • When the UNSC is unable to act in cases of violations against civilians in conflict, the General Assembly should hold the Security Council accountable using the Lichtenstein initiative.3

Recommendations for UN Peace Operations:

  • Continue to improve the implementation of comprehensive and integrated Protection of Civilians strategies, strengthen peacekeeping performance and accountability, and better communicate with key stakeholders about the impact of peacekeeping in protecting civilians.
  • Support the host states of peacekeeping missions in prioritizing the protection of civilians—in particular, by security and defense forces.
  • Better integrate activities with UN Country Team organizations and partner more substantively with national and civil society actors to build sustainable national protection capacity—including dedicated women and children protection mechanisms—that will pave the way for smoother UN transitions.
  • Develop exit strategies earlier in mission lifecycles, in close consultation with national stakeholders.
  • Build more strategic initiatives to identify, analyze, and address harmful MDMH, including by ensuring such efforts are whole-of-mission endeavors. In addition, better engage civil society in this regard, and optimize the use of UN-operated radio stations for this purpose.
  • Where relevant, consider and integrate climate-related security risks into analysis, planning and operations related to the protection of civilians, in coordination with UN agencies and civil society partners.

Recommendations for Regional Organizations/African Union:

  • When deploying forces to help address insecurity, learn from and build on the past experience of AU and UN missions in mitigating harm to civilians and protecting civilians from harm, including by deploying tools like civilian harm tracking.
  • Prioritize comprehensive solutions to conflict that are led by political and protection strategies, and pursue the integration of military, police, and civilian-led protection activities.
  • Strengthen good office efforts to further protection efforts and promote continued host state consent to peace operations deployed on their soil.
  • Increase regional justice and security coordination and collaboration to prevent cross-border recruitment of children into armed groups. In addition, support holistic, tailored, and sustainable disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration programs for children.